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ART. VII. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — *Synonyms of the New Testament.* By RICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. Seventh Edition, revised and enlarged. London: Macmillan & Co. 1871. 8vo. pp. xxvi, 363.

THE treatise of Archbishop Trench on the Synonyms of the New Testament first appeared in 1854, and was at once republished in this country. After passing through five editions, it was followed in 1863 by a "Second Part," likewise reprinted in New York in 1864. The two parts were published in one volume in 1865; and now the seventh edition, "revised and enlarged," attests the well-merited favor with which the work has been received. The Preface to this new edition is much enlarged, and contains some excellent observations on the value of the study of synonyms, and on the method in which it should be pursued. Other parts of the book bear marks of the careful revision which it has undergone. The amount of new matter, however, is not very large. Sections xlix., l., lxviii., xcii. — xvi., xcviii., xcix., and part of section c., are new, as compared with the first and third editions, reprinted in this country; section xlix. of the third edition has been cancelled. In sections ix., xix., xxii., lxxxiv. (= xxxiv. of Part II.), the synonyms *οἰκέτης*, *ἐντροπή*, *ἄρτιος*, and *κακός* are added.

I do not propose to enter upon a general review of a work which is universally recognized as the best on the subject of which it treats. It is enriched with observations gathered from a wide range of reading, and is full of acute remarks and fruitful suggestions; but the ingenious author has not elaborated all its parts with equal care, and in some cases his distinctions appear to be strikingly at variance with the actual usage of the words which he undertakes to discriminate. One example of this kind, involving questions of considerable theological interest, particularly deserves to be pointed out, as the statements of the Archbishop have been incautiously adopted by several respectable scholars both in England and Germany, and are likely to be received without question by the generality of readers. I refer to his distinction between the words *αἰρέω* and *ἐρωτάω*, discussed in section xl. of his work. He says: —

"The distinction between the words is this. *Αἰρέω*, the Latin '*peto*,' is more submissive and suppliant, indeed the constant word for the seeking of the inferior from the superior (Acts xii. 20); of the beggar from him that should give alms (Acts iii. 2); of the child from the parent (Matt. vii. 9;

Luke xi. 11; Lam. iv. 4); of the subject from the ruler (Ezra viii. 22); of man from God (1 Kin. iii. 11; Matt. vii. 7; Jam. i. 5; 1 John iii. 22; cf. Plato, *Euthyph.* 14; εὔχεσθαι [ἔστιν] αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς). Ἐρωτάω, on the other hand, is the Latin 'rogo'; or sometimes (as John xvi. 23; cf. Gen. xlv. 19) 'inter-rogo,' its only meaning in classical Greek, where it never signifies to ask, but only 'to interrogate,' or 'to inquire.' Like 'rogare,'* it implies that he who asks stands on a certain footing of equality with him from whom the boon is asked, as king with king (Luke xiv. 32), or, if not of equality, on such a footing of familiarity as lends authority to the request.

"Thus it is very noteworthy, and witnesses for the singular accuracy in the employment of words, and in the record of that employment, which prevails throughout the N. T., that our Lord never uses αἰτεῖν or αἰτεῖσθαι of himself, in respect of that which he seeks on behalf of his disciples from God; for his is not the *petition* of the creature to the Creator, but the *request* of the Son to the Father. The consciousness of his equal dignity, of his potent and prevailing intercession, speaks out in this, that often as he asks, or declares that he will ask, anything of the Father, it is always ἐρωτάω, ἐρωτήσω, an asking, that is, as upon equal terms (John xiv. 16; xvi. 26; xvii. 9, 15, 20), never αἰτέω or αἰτήσω." — *Synonyms*, etc. pp. 136, 137.

The view here presented by Archbishop Trench, which is, I believe, original, so far as his account of ἐρωτάω is concerned, has been substantially adopted by Düsterdieck in his commentary on 1 John v. 16 (*Die drei johan. Briefe*, II. 417), by Wordsworth (Greek Test.) on John xvi. 23 and 1 John v. 16, and by Webster and Wilkinson, Alford, and Braune in Lange's *Bibelwerk*, in their notes on 1 John v. 16. Braune says, without qualification, "ἐρωτᾶν is = *rogare*, and implies equality on the part of the asker with him from whom the favor is sought" (p. 171, Amer. transl.).

In opposition to these assertions, I shall endeavor to show that there is in the word ἐρωτάω no implication of equality on the part of the asker with him from whom the favor is sought, any more than there is in the English word *ask*; that there is not only no ground whatever for connecting such a notion with the word, but that its common use is totally inconsistent with this assumption.

The materials for forming a judgment upon this matter fortunately lie within a small compass. The use of ἐρωτάω in the sense of *to request*, as Archbishop Trench has remarked, does not belong to classical Greek; and in the later Greek, outside of the New Testament, it seems to be infrequent. After a pretty extensive examination of the general Greek Lexicons, from Stephens's *Thesaurus* in its several editions to the great work of Professor Sophocles on the Greek of the Roman and Byzantine

* "Thus Cicero (*Planc.* x. 25): 'Neque enim ego sic rogabam ut petere viderer, quia familiaris esset meus.'"

periods, and also of the special Lexicons, Commentaries, etc., illustrating the New Testament, I cannot find that more than nine examples of it have hitherto been adduced; while in one of these the meaning is questionable, and in another the text is uncertain.* In the New Testament, however, we have thirty-six clear examples of the use of the word in the sense referred to, besides one (John xvi. 23) in which its meaning has been disputed. The comparative frequency of this use of ἐρωτάω in the New Testament, though some have considered it a Latinism, is probably to be explained by the influence of the Hebrew or Aramæan on the Greek-speaking Jews, the Hebrew לָשַׁא, with its cognates in Chaldee and Syriac, being freely employed in both of the principal senses of the English word *ask*.

Let us then try the theory of Archbishop Trench by a few examples of the use of ἐρωτάω in the New Testament. (In quoting, I give the rendering of the common English version.) The first instance of its occurrence is in the account of the woman of Canaan or Syrophœnicia in Matt. xv. 23, where we read that the disciples of Jesus “came and besought him (ἐπώρων or ἐπώρου), saying, Send her away,” etc. Were the disciples of Jesus on a footing of equality with their Master, or of such familiarity as to lend authority to their request? The next example is in Mark vii. 26, where we are told respecting the Syrophœnician woman herself, that she “came and fell at his feet, and besought him (ἐπώρα) that he would cast forth the devil out of her daughter.” Did she address Christ on a footing of equality? In Luke vii. 3 the centurion is represented as sending elders of the Jews to Jesus, “beseeching him (ἐρωτῶν) that he would come and heal his servant.” So far from this petition having “authority” in it, or implying “a consciousness of equal dignity,” the centurion says (vv. 6, 7), that he was not worthy that Jesus should enter under his roof, and that he did not think himself worthy to come to him. In Luke viii. 37 we read that the Gadarenes “besought Jesus (ἐπώρησαν) to depart from them; for

* They are as follows: Sept. Ps. cxxi. 6 (doubtful). Joseph. *Ant.* v. 1. 14 (text uncertain). Hermog. *De Meth. Eloq.* c. 3, condemning this use of the word. Apollon. Dyse. *Synt.* p. 289, l. 20, ed. Bekker. Hermas, *Vis.* i. 2. Mart. Polyc. c. 12. Strato, *Epigr.* liii. 8 (Anthol. Gr. ed. Jacobs, iii. p. 80). Babr. *Fab.* xcvi. 3. Charit. viii. 7. — To these may be added the twenty-four following, which I have not seen before referred to: Jos. *Ant.* vii. 8. 1. Barnab. *Ep.* 4, 21 (*ter*). Hermas, *Vis.* ii. 2; iii. 1 (*bis*), 2, 10; iv. 1; *Sim.* v. 4; ix. 2, 11. Duæ Viæ vel Judic. Petri, in Hilgenfeld's *N. T. extra Canonem*, iv. p. 100, l. 20; 105, l. 1. Orac. Sibyl. ii. 310; viii. 355. Const. Apost. ii. 16. Babr. *Fab.* x. 8; xlii. 3. Suidas, s. vv. ἐρωτῶ σε and ἐπώρα. Zonaras, s. vv. ἐρωτῶ σε. The more important of these passages will be cited hereafter.

they were taken with great fear." In Luke xvi. 27 the word is used of the petition addressed to Abraham by the rich man in Hades, "I pray thee therefore, father" (ἐρωτῶ σὺν σε), etc. Did he, when he lifted up his eyes, being in torments, consider himself as on a footing of equality with the patriarch?

But perhaps the usage of John may favor the Archbishop's theory. Let us see. If the disciples of Christ addressed their Master with authority (John iv. 31), if the Samaritans when they "*besought* Jesus that he would tarry with them" (iv. 40), and the nobleman at Capernaum, who "*besought* him that he would come down and heal his son" (iv. 47), the Greeks who "came to Philip and *desired* him, saying, Sir, we would see Jesus" (xii. 21), the Jews who "*besought* Pilate that the legs of the crucified might be broken, and that they might be taken away" (xix. 31), and Joseph of Arimathæa, who "*besought* Pilate that he might take away the body of Jesus" (xix. 38), made these requests "as being on a footing of equality," and if it is also clear that this idea is expressed in these passages by the word ἐρωτάω itself, then, and not otherwise, is Archbishop Trench's view confirmed by the usage of John. In reference to the last passage cited, it deserves particular notice that the first three evangelists, in describing this request of Joseph of Arimathæa, use the word αἰτέομαι (ἡτήσατο τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, Matt. xxvii. 58, Mark xv. 43, Luke xxiii. 52), where John employs ἐρωτάω (ἡρώτησεν τὸν Πιλάτον . . . ἵνα ἄρῃ τὸ σῶμα, κ. τ. λ.).*

It can hardly be necessary to proceed much further in the citation of passages from the New Testament. The first example in the Book of Acts (iii. 3) may seem alone decisive of the question. There, in the account of the man lame from his birth, it is said that he was laid daily at the Beautiful Gate of the Temple to ask alms (αἰτεῖν ἐλεημοσύνην) of those who went into the Temple, and seeing Peter and John about to go into the Temple he *asked* alms (ἡρώτα ἐλεημοσύνην λαβεῖν). Did he ask this as a right, or as being "on a footing of equality"? We may

* I am indebted for this observation to "a Clergyman of the Church of England," the anonymous author of "An Examination of Canon Liddon's Bampton Lectures on the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ" (Lond. 1871), p. 263, note, to whom belongs the credit, so far as I know, of first pointing out the untenableness of Archbishop Trench's statements respecting the use of the word ἐρωτάω. This able writer, however, enters into no full discussion of the subject, and is far too liberal in conceding that "about the general accuracy of the distinction on which the Archbishop insists, there can be no dispute," contending merely for an exception in the New Testament usage. We shall see that the examples of the word outside of the New Testament are equally at war with the Archbishop's theory.

further observe that αἰρέω is here *interchanged* with ἐρωτάω, though this is one of the very passages adduced by Archbishop Trench to illustrate the distinction between the words. The other passages in which the word ἐρωτάω occurs in the Acts are ch. x. 48; xvi. 39; xviii. 20; xxiii. 18, 20. None of them favors the Archbishop's view.*

What now are the facts adduced by Archbishop Trench in proof of his position that ἐρωτάω implies a certain equality between the asker and the person asked? The reader may be somewhat surprised to learn that no evidence is adduced by him or his followers except what is contained in the extracts from his article already given. Passing by the mere assertion that in certain passages of John's Gospel ἐρωτάω is used by Christ with this implication, we find that the only passage of the New Testament referred to in support of this theory is Luke xiv. 32. Here the argument is, that as one king is represented as asking another king for conditions of peace, "the word implies that he who asks stands on a certain footing of equality with him from whom the boon is asked."

Now the mere fact that, in any single case of the use of the word ἐρωτάω, the parties in question are equals, obviously cannot prove that such equality is implied by the word itself. The only possible proof of the Archbishop's thesis must consist in establishing the fact, by induction from a large number of examples, that the word is always, or at least generally, used of requests made by one who is regarded as standing on a footing of equality with him from whom the favor is sought. That the word is not so used has already been shown. But waiving all this, the Archbishop seems to forget that the king in the passage referred to is represented, not as conscious of equality with the hostile king, but of his *inequality*,—his inability to meet, with ten thousand men, him that cometh against him with twenty thousand; so that, when the other is a great way off, he sends an embassy "to ask for conditions of peace," or, as Campbell and Norton in their translations have very naturally phrased it, "to sue for peace."

It is difficult to imagine that this passage of the New Testament, or any other, could have suggested the notion which the Archbishop has affixed to the word. He seems to have been really influenced by the supposed analogy of the Latin *rogo*, which does correspond, in its

* For completeness, the only passages in the New Testament not already cited in which ἐρωτάω has or may have the meaning "to request" are here referred to, with the rendering of the word in the common English version: *Ask*, John xvi. 23, first part? *Desire*, Luke vii. 36; xiv. 32. *Pray*, Luke v. 3; xiv. 18, 19; John xiv. 16; xvi. 26; xvii. 9 *bis*, 15, 20; 1 John v. 16. *Beseech*, Luke iv. 38; xi. 37; 1 Thes. iv. 1; v. 12; 2 Thes. ii. 1; 2 John 5. *Entreat*, Phil. iv. 3.

double meaning and otherwise, very closely with *ἑρωτάω*, and is used as its representative throughout the Latin Vulgate. Trench, as we have seen, asserts that "*rogo* implies that he who asks stands on a certain footing of equality with him from whom the boon is asked," while *peto*, corresponding with *αἰτέω*, is the word appropriate to an inferior; and the following passage of Cicero is quoted to prove it: "Neque enim ego sic *rogabam*, ut *petere* viderer, quia familiaris esset meus" (*Planc.* x. 25). This statement in regard to the use of *rogo* I believe to be incorrect, though something like it may be found in Doederlein's Latin Synonyms, and in the valuable English-Latin Dictionary lately published by Dr. William Smith and Theophilus D. Hall (see the art. *Ask*). The passage from Cicero quoted above seems to have been supposed by Trench and Alford (who, with Düsterdieck, has quoted it after him) to have the following meaning: "For I did not *ask* in such a way as to seem to *beg*, because he [of whom I asked the favor] was my intimate friend"; though a careful reader who should thus construe the words might be a little staggered by the subjunctive *esset*, where *erat* would seem to be required by the laws of grammar. Now nothing like this is the real meaning of the passage. The object of *rogabam* and *petere* is not the person spoken of as "*familiaris meus*." The sentence is imperfectly quoted, and the Archbishop appears to have caught it up hastily from his Latin Dictionary, without taking the trouble to look into Cicero. It is necessary, therefore, to point out the connection in which it stands, and to explain the true force and bearing of the words. Plancius was accused of having obtained the ædileship by bribery of voters. Cicero in defending him urges, among other things, that he had himself secured many votes for him by his personal influence. Cicero's private obligations to Plancius were so great that the friends of Cicero were constrained to vote for him. *Rogabam* in the passage in question is a technical term, denoting the soliciting of votes for a candidate for office. The full sentence reads as follows: "Neque enim ego sic *rogabam*, ut *petere* viderer, quia familiaris esset meus, quia vicinus, quia huius parente semper plurimum essem usus, sed ut quasi parenti et custodi salutis meæ." It may be thus translated: "For I did not solicit the votes of the people in such a way as to seem to beg them for Plancius because he was my intimate friend, because he was my neighbor, because I had always been on terms of the most familiar intercourse with his father; but as asking them for one who was as it were my own parent, and the guardian of my safety." The meaning of the passage does not turn, as Trench seems to suppose, on a contrast between *rogare* and *petere*. On the contrary, the words are here interchanged, — the *rogatio* is described

as a *petitio*; and Cicero had just before spoken of it in the following terms: “. . . *precibus* aliquid attulimus etiam nos. Appellavi populum tributum; *submisi me et supplicavi*.” Instead, therefore, of favoring Archbishop Trench's view of the use of *rogare*, the passage is directly opposed to it.

It would lead us too far from our proper subject to discuss the uses of *rogo* and its distinction from *peto*, but it may be worth while to refer to a few passages which show how false is the supposition that it implies the asking of what one has a right to, or carries with it any notion of equality. “*Molestum verbum est, onerosum, demisso voltu dicendum, Rogo*,” says Seneca. “*Properet licet, sero beneficium dedit, qui roganti dedit*.” (*De Benef.* ii. 2. Comp. also c. 1.) “In blandiendo, fatendo, satisfaciendo, *rogando*,” says Quintilian, the voice should be “*lenis et summissa*.” (*Inst. Or.* xi. 3. 63.) Comp. Ovid, *Met.* vii. 90, “*auxilium submissa voce rogavit*,” and *Pont.* iv. 3. 41. Finally, *rogare* is often used of prayer to the gods, who are not usually supposed to be addressed on terms of equality; e. g. “*Deos supplex rogavi*,” Ovid. *Ep.* ii. 17; “*Suppliciter rogate Deos*,” Id. *Pont.* i. 10. 44, comp. ii. 3, 100, iv. 8, 3; “*Otium divos rogat*,” Hor. *Carm.* ii. 16. 1.

We have seen that Archbishop Trench finds in the use of *ἐρωτάω* and the non-use of *αἰρέω* on the part of our Lord in his prayers to the Father, “the consciousness of his equal dignity.” We shall consider hereafter the real distinction between the words, and shall not find, I think, that the phenomenon in question requires us to assume that, in the passages to which he refers, an idea is implied in the word *ἐρωτάω* which cannot be shown to belong to it anywhere else. And the Archbishop does not seem to have observed that very different and rather startling conclusions might be drawn, with equal plausibility, from the premises which he assumes in regard to this word. We might say, for example, that it is very noteworthy, and witnesses for the singular accuracy in the employment of words which prevails throughout the New Testament, that *αἰρεῖν* or *αἰρεῖσθαι*, the constant word for the seeking of the inferior from the superior, is never used in respect of that which the Apostles ask of Christ, but is appropriated to their petitions to God (Matt. xviii. 19; xxi. 22; John xv. 16; xvi. 23, etc.). When they are represented as requesting anything of Christ, the word *ἐρωτᾶν* is employed (Matt. xv. 23; Luke iv. 38; John iv. 31), implying an asking as upon equal terms. The only exception is in Mark x. 35, but in that case, as we learn from the parallel passage (Matt. xx. 20), the petition was not really presented by the Apostles James and John directly, but through their mother, who fell down before Jesus and

begged the favor, so that the apparent exception really confirms the rule. — This may suffice for an *argumentum ad hominem*.

The concluding paragraph of Archbishop Trench's article reads thus in the seventh edition (p. 138) : —

"It will follow that the *ἐρωτᾶν*, being thus proper for Christ, inasmuch as it has authority in it, is not proper for us ; and in no single instance is it used in the N. T. to express the prayer of man to God, of the creature to the Creator. The only passage seeming to contradict this assertion is 1 John v. 16. The verse is difficult, but whichever of the various ways of overcoming its difficulty may find favor, it will be found to constitute no true exception to the rule, and perhaps, in the substitution of *ἐρωτήσῃ* for the *αἰτήσῃ* of the earlier clause of the verse, will rather confirm it."

The passage in question is as follows in the common version : —

"If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask (*αἰτήσῃ*), and he shall give him life for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin unto death ; I do not say that he shall pray for it" (*οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγει ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ*).

It should be noted here that the word translated "it" in the last clause of the verse is emphatic in the original, and should have been rendered "that" or "this."

The Archbishop unfortunately does not favor us with his view of the passage, and indeed seems to be doubtful about its meaning ; he is only sure that, at all events, the true explanation will present no exception to his rule about the use of *ἐρωτάω*. In the earlier editions of the Synonyms reprinted in this country he did propose an explanation, which, though adopted by Alford and others, seems now to have been discreetly abandoned by its original propounder. According to his former view, it was the design of the Apostle by the use of the word *ἐρωτήσῃ* in the last clause to declare that "the Christian intercessor for his brethren shall not assume the authority which would be implied in making request for a sinner who had sinned the sin unto death" (*Syn.*, p. 198, Amer. ed.). The Archbishop has probably since perceived that the result of assigning this meaning to *ἐρωτάω* here, and laying stress on the supposed difference between it and *αἰτέω*, must be to suggest that, though a person is not permitted *ἐρωτᾶν*, to ask with authority for the pardon of a sin unto death, he is permitted *αἰτεῖν*, to ask humbly for it. But this is evidently contrary to the meaning of the Apostle, as it would render nugatory the restriction in the first clause of the verse. Saint John, moreover, would hardly deem it necessary to tell his readers that he did not mean to have them address their prayers to God "as being on a footing of equality" with him.

Bishop Wordsworth gives a different explanation. He adopts the

view of Archbishop Trench, that ἐρωτάω expresses "the request of an equal, who has a right to ask and obtain," but does not introduce that meaning here. His translation of the passage is certainly remarkable: "I am not speaking concerning that, in order that he (the Christian brother) should ask"; and the explanation matches it. He understands Saint John "to intimate that no *interrogatory questions* are to be addressed to God concerning the person who is sinning a sin unto death." The view of Webster and Wilkinson is similar: "The Apostle checks the approach to the throne of grace as to an oracle to inquire (ἐρωτᾶν) with the intention of αἰτεῖν." Whether this is the view which Archbishop Trench is now inclined to entertain, I do not know; it does not appear to have occurred to any commentator, ancient or modern, except those whom I have just quoted.

Dismissing, then, these unnatural explanations, which seem to have been suggested by the exigencies of a theory, let us turn once more to the passage. Is it not evident that the Apostle is stating in a positive form, in the last clause of the verse, the restriction implied in the first? "There is a sin unto death"; [when I say that he shall ask, αἰτήσῃ,] I do not say that he shall pray (or, "I do not bid him pray") for *that* (οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγω ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ).^{*} He has been speaking of *petitions*, not of an "oracle," or of "interrogatory questions addressed to God."

We may now consider the use of the word ἐρωτάω outside of the New Testament. The earliest example adduced is from the Septuagint, Ps. cxxi. (Heb. cxxii.) 6, ἐρωτήσατε δὴ τὰ εἰς εἰρήνην τὴν Ἱερουσαλήμ, which has been translated, "Pray for the peace of Jerusalem." This is probably the true rendering of the original Hebrew (see Maurer and Hupfeld *in loc.*), though some understand it differently. But if we follow the analogy of precisely the same phraseology in other passages of the Septuagint (see 1 Sam. x. 4, ἐρωτήσουσιν σε τὰ εἰς εἰρήνην, also xxx. 21; 2 Sam. viii. 10; 1 Chr. xviii. 10), we shall make the verbal meaning of the Greek translation to be, "Ask Jerusalem concerning her peace," that is, as the phrase is used elsewhere, "*Salute* Jerusalem," wish her all prosperity. (Comp. the rendering of Symmachus, ἀσπάσασθε.) If ἐρωτήσατε is here taken in the sense of "pray,"

^{*} If λέγω here means "to say," and not "to speak" (for which λαλέω would be the proper word), ἵνα cannot mean "in order that," but introduces an object-clause, as in Acts xix. 4, John xiii. 29, comp. Rev. vi. 11, ix. 4, Matt. iv. 3, etc., and Sophocles, Gr. Lex. art. λέγω. The word as used here and in the other examples cited is nearly equivalent to κελεύω. The preposition περὶ is to be connected with ἐρωτήσῃ, as in Luke iv. 38, John xvii. 9, etc. Comp. δέομαι περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν, Eccles. xxi. 1, xxviii. 4, xxxix. 5.

we must suppose an ellipsis of *τὸν θεόν* as the being addressed, which would give us the extraordinary construction of three accusatives after the verb. We should expect, instead of the third accusative, *τῇ Ἱερουσαλὴμ*, as the verse is inaccurately quoted by Bishop Ellicott on 1 Thess. iv. 1, and by Webster in his "Syntax and Synonyms of the Greek Testament." It is also to be observed, that we thus assign to *ἐρωτάω* a meaning which it has nowhere else in the Septuagint. Such being the state of the case, although the passage is adduced by Bretschneider, Robinson, Bloomfield, Grimm, Sophocles, and other lexicographers, as an example of *ἐρωτάω* in the sense of "to pray," I shall not urge it against Archbishop Trench's theory.

The next passage in chronological order is in Josephus, *Ant.* v. 1. 14, where, after giving the prayer of Joshua, he says, *ταῦτα μὲν Ἰησοῦς ἐπὶ στόμα πεσὼν ἠρώτα τὸν θεόν*. Here, if the text is correct, *ἐρωτάω* is clearly used of the prayer of man to God. This is the reading in the editions of Hudson and Havercamp, and in the earlier editions of Josephus. Dindorf and Bekker, however, have substituted for *ἠρώτα τὸν θεόν*, *τὸν θεὸν ἰκέτευε*. Notwithstanding the authority of these eminent critical editors, it seems to me that not only does the external evidence, as given in Bernard's note in Havercamp's edition, decidedly favor the reading *ἠρώτα*, but the internal still more. This use of *ἐρωτάω* being rare, and condemned by some of the rhetoricians, it was very natural that a gloss like *ἰκέτευε* should be substituted for it in some MSS.; just as Zonaras (*Ann.* i. 20), in copying this account of Josephus, has substituted *ἐδέετο τοῦ θεοῦ*. Comp. Suidas: *Ἡρώτα · παρεκάλει, ἔθνευ, ἡὔχετο, ἰκέτευεν*,* and see also his art. *ἐρωτῶ σε*, cited on the next page.

But whatever may be thought of this passage of Josephus, a plenty of unquestionable examples may be cited of *ἐρωτάω* used in reference to prayer addressed to God, or to heathen deities. See *Hermas*, *Vis.* i. 2, *ἐρωτήσω τὸν κύριον, ἵνα ἰλατεύσῃ* [*Sin. ἰλατεύσῃται*] *μοι*, also *ibid.* ii. 2, iii. 1 (*bis*), iv. 1; *Sim.* v. 4, ix. 2, in all of which passages *κύριον* is the object; *Orac. Sibyl.* ii. 310, *Πολλὰ δ' ἐρωτήσουσι ματὴν θεὸν ὑψιμέδοντα*, and viii. 355, *Πολλὰ δ' ἐρωτήσουσι θεὸν γε τὸν αἰὲν ἔοντα* (so *Alexandre*; *Friedlieb* makes the line identical with ii. 310); and *Babr. Fab.* x. 8, *τὴν Ἀφροδίτην . . . ἔθνευ, ἡὔχεθ', ἰκέτευεν, ἠρώτα*.

Other passages may be adduced in opposition to Archbishop Trench's

* Here, however, as *ἔθνευ* is inappropriate as an explanation, I would suggest that Suidas needs emendation, and that we should read, *Ἡρώτα · παρεκάλει. ἔθνευ, ἡὔχετο, ἰκέτευεν, ἠρώτα*, taking all after *παρεκάλει* as a quotation from *Babrius*, *Fab.* x. 8, to be cited below. *Ἡρώτα* is actually added after *ἰκέτευεν*, making the line complete, in three MSS. and the first edition of Suidas. See *Bernhardy's* note.

notion that *ἑρωτάω* implies "an asking as upon equal terms," or with "authority." In the Epistle ascribed to Barnabas, where the word *ἑρωτάω* occurs four times (cc. 4, 21 thrice) in exhortation, in the sense of "to entreat," "beseech," we read (c. 21), *ἑρωτῶ ὑμᾶς, χάριν αἰτούμενος*, "I entreat you, *asking it as a favor*." In *Hermas* it is used of the humble entreaty addressed by the writer to the woman, representing the Church, who appeared to him in a vision (*Vis.* iii. 2, *πεσὼν δὲ αὐτῆς πρὸς τοὺς πόδας ἠρώτησα αὐτήν* . . . *ἴνα*, κ. τ. λ., also *ibid.* iii. 10), and to the Shepherd or angel of repentance (*Sim.* ix. 11). In the epistle of the Church at Smyrna, giving an account of the martyrdom of Polycarp (c. 12), the angry multitude are said to have *besought* (*ἠρώτων*) the Asiarch to let loose a lion upon Polycarp. And in the Apostolical Constitutions (Lib. ii. c. 16) the word is used of the entreaty to be addressed to the bishop in behalf of a penitent brother.

The notices of the word by the old grammarians and lexicographers may now be quoted. Hermogenes (*De Meth. Elog.* c. 3) condemns the use of *ἑρωτάω* and *παρακαλέω* in the sense of *δέομαι*, "to beg," "to entreat," restricting the former to the meaning "to inquire":—*ἐὰν εἴπῃ τις ἑρωτῶ καὶ παρακαλῶ ἀντὶ τοῦ δέομαι, ἀκύρως εἴρηκε. τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρακαλεῖν ἢ καλεῖν ἐστὶν ἢ προτρέπεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἑρωτᾶν πυνθάνεσθαι.* (Walz, *Rhet. Gr.* iii. 404.)

Apollonius Dyscolus enumerates among the words "which denote supplication," *ὅσα ἱκετεῖαν σημαίνει*, — *γουνούμαι, ἑρωτῶ σε ἐν ἴσῳ τῷ παρακαλῶ σε, λιτανεύω, ἱκνούμαι.* (*Synl.* p. 289 ed. Bekker.)

Suidas under the word *ἠρώτα* has already been quoted. He also has: *Ἐρωτῶ σε· παρακαλῶ σε, ἱκετεύω σε, δέομαι. Καὶ αὖθις· Ἐλθεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον ἠρώτα, ἀντὶ τοῦ παρεκάλει.* Here the line is quoted from Babrius, *Fab.* xlii. 3. Compare also Babrius, *Fab.* xcvi. 3, *τὸν ταῦρον ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον ἠρώτα*, and the same use of the word in Luke vii. 36, xi. 37.

Zonaras has *Ἐρωτῶ σε· παρακαλῶ σε, ἱκετεύω σε*, and quotes the same passage as Suidas. The word does not appear to have been noticed by Hesychius, Photius, and the other old lexicographers and grammarians.

The few remaining examples of *ἑρωτάω* outside of the New Testament are not of sufficient interest to be quoted.

The preceding examination of the use of *ἑρωτάω* may satisfy us that Archbishop Trench's theory not only has no foundation to rest upon, but that it is directly contradicted by a large majority of the passages in which the word occurs, both in the New Testament and the later Greek writers. We will now consider the use of *αἰτέω*.

In the extract already given from Archbishop Trench's article, he represents *αἰρέω*, compared with *ἐρωτάω*, as "more submissive and suppliant, indeed the constant word for the seeking of the inferior from the superior," and this statement may seem to be supported by the prevailing usage of the word. His view accords also with that of Bengel (notes on John xi. 22 and 1 John v. 16), and of Webster in his "Syntax and Synonyms of the Greek Testament," p. 190.

The following passages, however, must at least be regarded as exceptions, and may suggest a doubt as to the correctness of the distinction asserted: Luke i. 63, "he *asked for* a writing-table and wrote" (*αἰρήσας . . . ἔγραψεν*); xii. 48, "to whom men have committed much, of him they *will ask* (require) the more" (*αἰρήσουσιν*); Acts xvi. 29, "Then he *called for* a light" (*αἰρήσας*); 1 Cor. i. 22, "For the Jews *require* signs" (*αἰτρουσιν*); and 1 Pet. iii. 15, "Be always ready to give an answer to every man that *asketh* you (*αἰτοῦντι*) a reason for the hope that is in you." In the Septuagint we read, "What doth the Lord thy God *require* (*αἰτεῖται*) of thee?" (Deut. x. 12.) See also 2 Macc. vii. 10. Similar examples from Philo and Josephus are given by Loesner, *Obs.* p. 118, and Krebs, *Obs.* p. 117, though *ἀπαυρέω* is generally used to express the idea of *demanding*.

If we are guided by the actual usage of the words, we shall be led to the conclusion that the distinction between *αἰρέω* and *ἐρωτάω* in Hellenistic Greek does not depend upon the relative dignity of the asker and the person asked. In this respect they seem to be neutral, as much so as our English word *ask*.

The main distinction appears to be this: *Αἰρέω* is, in general, to ask for something which one desires to *receive*, something to be *given*, rarely for something to be done; it is therefore used when the *object sought*, rather than the person of whom it is sought, is prominent in the mind of the writer; hence also it is very rarely employed in exhortation. *Ἐρωτάω*, on the other hand, is to request or beseech a person to *do* something, rarely to give something; it refers more directly to the *person* of whom the favor is sought, and is therefore naturally used in exhortation and entreaty.

Doederlein notes a similar distinction between *petere* and *rogare*. "As compared with *petere*," he says, "*rogare* refers immediately to the *person* who is applied to for a service; *petere*, on the other hand, to the *object* sought. Cic. in *Verr.* Iste *petit* a rege et *eum* pluribus verbis *rogat*, uti ad se mittat," etc. (*Lat. Syn.* v. 229, 230.)

In confirmation of this view, I will give the results of an examination of the use of *αἰρέω* in the New Testament, the Septuagint, the so-called Apostolical Fathers, and some other early Christian writings.

For the canonical books of the Septuagint I have used the Concordance of Trommius, and for the Apocrypha Wahl's *Clavis*; for Clement of Rome, Polycarp, and the Ignatian writings, Jacobson's Index to his edition of the *Patres Apostolici*; for Barnabas and Hermas, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, and the Epistle to Diognetus, my own notes. The classical use of the word is not important for our present purpose.

To illustrate the distinction referred to, little will be needed besides the statistics of the *construction* of αἰρέω as contrasted with ἐπαιράω. Both words must of course have both a person and a thing as their objects, expressed or implied. But the different construction of the words shows that their relation to these objects was usually conceived of differently. In the case of αἰρέω, which occurs in the New Testament seventy-one times, we have:

1. The thing only expressed, thirty-six times. Twice (Luke xxii. 23; Acts iii. 14) the object is an accusative with the infinitive; twice (Acts vii. 46; Eph. iii. 13) an infinitive only; once (Col. i. 9) ἵνα with the subjunctive.

2. Thing, and person with the preposition παρὰ or ἀπὸ, three times.

3. Person and thing, two accusatives, ten times; thing expressed by accusative with infinitive, once (Acts xiii. 28).

4. The person only expressed, in the accusative case, six times; Matt. v. 42; vi. 8; vii. 11; Luke vi. 30; xi. 13; John iv. 10.

5. Neither person nor thing expressed, but the thing more prominent in the context, fifteen times.

One who shall examine the New Testament examples by the aid of his Concordance, will find that in a great majority of the seventy-one passages the request is for something to be *given*, not *done*; and that the *thing asked for*, rather than the *person*, is chiefly prominent in the mind of the writer. Even in the six examples cited under number four, where the personal object alone is expressed, the exception is rather apparent than real; e. g. Matt. v. 42, "give to him that *asketh* thee," where the thing to be given is not specified on account of the comprehensiveness of the injunction.

In the Septuagint αἰρέω occurs about eighty-two times, including thirteen in the Apocrypha. We have:

1. The thing asked for only expressed, thirty-six times. (In 1 Sam. xii. 13 I adopt the reading of the Alexandrine manuscript.)

2. Thing in the accusative (with one exception), and person in the genitive with παρὰ, twenty-six times.

3. Person and thing both expressed in the accusative, ten times. Passive participle, perhaps with accusative of thing, once (2 Macc. vii. 10).

4. Person only, in the genitive with *παρά*, four times. There is *no* example of the construction with the accusative of a person only. (In Esth. vii. 7 I adopt the reading of the Roman edition and the Alexandrine manuscript.)

5. Neither person nor thing expressed, five times.

The result is that in nearly all, perhaps in all, the examples found in the Septuagint we may reasonably regard the object asked for as made more prominent than the person. This object is also almost always something to be *given*, rather than something to be *done*; and accordingly is only once expressed by *ὅπως* with the subjunctive, never by *ἵνα*, and never by an infinitive of which the person asked is the subject. We shall see a striking contrast in the construction of *ἐρωτάω*.

In the Apostolical Fathers and other early Christian writings before mentioned I have noted forty-four examples of *αἰτέω* or *αἰτέομαι*, namely: Clem. Rom. *Ep.* i. 50, 53, 55. Barn. 21 (in c. 19 probably spurious). Polyc. *Phil.* 7. Ignat. *Trall.* 12; *Rom.* 1, 3, 8 (*bis*); *Polyc.* 1, 2. Mart. Ignat. 6. Hermas, *Vis.* iii. 3, 10 (four times); *Mand.* ix. (eleven times), xii. 5; *Sim.* iv., v. 3, 4 (five times), vi. 3. *Ep. ad Diogn.* 1. Test. xii. Patr., *Jud.* 9, *Jos.* 15, 16 (three times; I adopt the reading of the Oxford MS.). They are constructed as follows:—

1. Thing only expressed, twenty times.
2. Thing, and person with *παρά* or *ἀπό*, ten times.
3. Person and thing, two accusatives, twice. Person in accusative, and object represented by *λέγοντες* with imperative, once (Test. xii. Patr., *Jos.* 15).
4. Person only in genitive with *παρά*, seven times.
5. Person only, in the accusative, twice.
6. Neither person nor thing expressed, twice.

Without going into a more minute analysis, we perceive that the result is essentially the same as in our examination of the usage of the New Testament and the Septuagint.

Contrast now the construction of *ἐρωτάω*, of which we have in all sixty-six or sixty-seven examples. We find:

1. The person only directly expressed (in the accusative), eighteen times. The object sought is understood nine times (Luke iv. 38; John xiv. 16; xvi. 26; Barn. 21; Const. Apost. ii. 16; Apollon. *Dysc. Synt.* p. 289; Babr. x. 8; Suidas, s. v. *ἐρωτῶ σε*; Zonaras, do.);—indirectly signified by an imperative, six times (Luke xiv. 18, 19; Phil. iv. 3; Barn. 21 (*bis*); Duæ Viæ, p. 100, l. 20, ed. Hilgenf.); by an imperative preceded by *λέγοντες*, twice (Matt. xv. 23; John iv. 31); by *λέγοντες* introducing a sentence with the verb in the indic-

ative, once (John xii. 21). The passive participle is used, without object expressed, twice (Strato, *Epigr.* liii. 8; Charit. viii. 7).

2. Accusative of person; thing variously expressed, viz. (a) by an accusative, five or six times (John xvi. 23? Jos. *Ant.* v. 1. 14; Barn. 4; Herm. *Vis.* ii. 2; Orac. Sibyl. ii. 310; viii. 355). (b) By an infinitive, eight times (Luke v. 3; viii. 37; John iv. 40; Acts x. 48; 1 Thes. v. 12; Jos. *Ant.* vii. 8. 1; Duæ Viæ, p. 105, l. 2; Babr. xcvi. 3). (c) By *ἵνα* with subjunctive, fifteen times (Mark vii. 26; Luke vii. 26; xvi. 27; John xix. 31, 38; 1 Thes. iv. 1; 2 John 5; Mart. Polyc. 12; Herm. *Vis.* i. 2; iii. 2, 10; iv. 1; *Sim.* v. 4; ix. 2, 11). (d) By *ὅπως* with the subjunctive, three times (Luke vii. 3; xi. 37; Acts xxiii. 20). (e) By *εἰς τό* with infinitive, once (2 Thes. ii. 1). In all, thirty-two or thirty-three times.

3. Thing only expressed; (a) by an accusative, once (Luke xiv. 32). (b) By an infinitive, four times (Acts iii. 3; xvi. 39; xxiii. 18; Babr. xlii. 3). (c) By *ἵνα* with subjunctive, four times (John iv. 47 (Tisch.); xvii. 15, 20; Herm. *Vis.* iii. 1). In all these cases the *person* is prominent in the context. (Nine times.)

4. Neither person nor thing expressed, five times (John xvii. 9, *bis*; 1 John v. 16; Herm. *Vis.* iii. 1, *bis*).

The difference of construction illustrates palpably the reality of the distinction pointed out. Of the sixty-six or sixty-seven examples of the use of *ἐρωτάω*, there are only six or seven in which the object asked for is expressed by an accusative; in a great majority of cases it is expressed by an infinitive, or by *ἵνα* or *ὅπως* with the subjunctive, or indirectly by an imperative, the thing asked for being usually something which the person asked is requested to *do*. In the one hundred and ninety-seven examples, on the other hand, which have been cited of the use of *αἰτέω* or *αἰτέομαι*, there is not a single instance in which the thing asked for is something which the person is directly requested to do; generally, it is something to be *given*, and the object asked for is expressed by an accusative. Thus we see why in Matt. xxvii. 58 and the parallel passages in Mark and Luke we have *ἡτήσατο τὸ σῶμα κ. τ. λ.*, but in John *ἡρώτησεν τὸν Πειλᾶτον . . . ἵνα ἄρῃ τὸ σῶμα, κ. τ. λ.* In John xiv. 16 and xvi. 26, *ἐρωτάω* may be preferred to *αἰτέω*, because the *personal object* not only is prominent, but is alone expressed; in the prayer John xvii. 9, 15, 20, the personal object indeed is not expressed, but is prominent in the mind from the nature of the case. It may also be true that *ἐρωτάω*, though not implying "equality" or "authority," accords better than *αἰτέω* with the intimate personal relation between Christ and the Father, and also with that between Christ and his disciples. In Acts iii. 2, 3, the transition from *αἰτεῖν* to

ἑρωτᾶν may perhaps be explained by the prominence given in the third verse to Peter and John, the *persons* from whom the alms was asked, though the personal object is not expressed after the verb. It is further evident that with *ἑρωτάω* the idea of earnestness is often associated; see, e. g. Mark vii. 26; Luke viii. 37; xvi. 27. Our translators have felt this, in rendering the word so often "beseech" or "entreat." This is much more rarely the case with *αἰτέω* or *αἰτέομαι*, which is accordingly seldom used in exhortations. The exception in Ignat. *Trall.* 8 is so unusual, that Vossius insists that the true reading there must be *παρακαλῶ*. The use of *αἰτοῦμαι* in Eph. iii. 13; *Διὸ αἰτοῦμαι μὴ ἐνκακεῖν ἐν ταῖς θλίψεσιν μου ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*, accordingly favors the rendering, "Wherefore I pray that I may not be disheartened in my afflictions in your behalf," rather than, "I entreat you not to be disheartened," etc., though many of the best scholars prefer the latter.*

If the preceding statements are correct, we cannot accept the distinction between *ἑρωτάω* and *αἰτέω* which Huther proposes, in the last edition of his Commentary on the First Epistle of John (note on 1 John v. 16). He says that *ἑρωτᾶν*, properly "to inquire" (*fragen*), is a milder asking than *αἰτεῖν*, which properly means "to demand" (*fordern*), and expresses greater urgency. Bengel, in his note on the same passage, regards *ἑρωτᾶν* as denoting the "*genus*," of which *αἰτεῖν* is a "*species humilior*"; in other words, *ἑρωτᾶν* is "to ask," in general, while *αἰτεῖν* is "to ask humbly," "to beg." (Compare his note on John xi. 22.) But we have seen that this view is not sufficiently supported by usage.

In the comparison which has been made between *ἑρωτάω* and *αἰτέω*, it must be borne in mind that the former word, in the sense of "to request" or "entreat," appears never to have had a wide currency. It seems to have been familiar in this sense to Luke, John, Paul, Hermas, the author of the Epistle ascribed to Barnabas, and Babrius; it does not occur in the Septuagint, is rare in Josephus, and seems to be very rare in the later Greek generally. We find commonly in its place *ἀξιώω*, *δέομαι*, or *παρακαλέω*. Though this use of *παρακαλέω* is condemned by Hermogenes, it is remarkably frequent in Josephus; it occurs a few times in the Septuagint, but there we have more commonly *δ'ομαι* or *ἀξιώω*. One might suppose from its etymology and classical use that

* On the side of the former construction (for which comp. Ignat. *Trall.* 12, *αἰτούμενος θεοῦ ἐπιτυχεῖν*) are the Syriac version, Theodoret, Bengel, Rückert, Harless, Baumgarten-Crusius, Olshausen, Wahl, Bretschneider, Conybeare, Braune, Ewald; the latter is supported by Theophylact, Grotius, LeClerc, Beaussobre, Wolf, Matthies, De Wette, Meyer, Bleek, Schenkel, Alford, Ellicott, Eadie, Noyes, and the majority of expositors.

the latter word would have the sense which Archbishop Trench ascribes to ἐρωτάω, of asking for something to which one has a certain right ; but it is not so. It is used in the simple sense of to express a desire for something ; or, with reference to a person, “to ask,” “request,” “pray.” It often occurs with τὸν θεόν or κύριον as its object ; and is even used absolutely, as we should use “to pray” in English. Δέομαι is also frequently thus used ; and, what will seem very strange to a merely classical scholar, is often followed in the Septuagint, and once in the New Testament, by πρὸς with the accusative, like εὔχομαι and προσεύχομαι.

We will conclude this long discussion with the examination of a passage of considerable interest, in which the meaning of ἐρωτάω has been disputed. I refer to John xvi. 23, which reads as follows in Tischendorf's last edition : Καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐρωτήσετε οὐδέν. ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἂν τι αἰτήσητε τὸν πατέρα, δώσει ὑμῖν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου. “And in that day ye will ask nothing of *me*. Truly, truly do I say to you, if ye ask anything of the Father, he will give it to you in my name.”

The question is, whether ἐρωτάω is here used in the sense of “to inquire,” as in vv. 19, 30, or “to request,” as in ver. 26. Archbishop Trench remarks : —

“Every one competent to judge is agreed, that ‘ye shall ask’ of the first half of the verse has nothing to do with ‘ye shall ask’ of the second ; that in the first Christ is referring back to the ἠθέλον αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν of ver. 19 ; to the questions which the disciples would fain have asked of him, if only they dared to set these before him. ‘In that day,’ he would say, ‘in the day of my seeing you again, I will by the Spirit so teach you all things, that ye shall be no longer perplexed, no longer wishing to ask me questions (cf. John xxi. 12) if only you might venture to do so.’” — *Syn.*, p. 136.

The explanation given by Archbishop Trench is supported by Lampe, Bengel, Rosenmüller, Kuinoel, De Wette, Meyer, Ewald, Godet, Bloomfield, Alford, and a large majority of modern expositors ; also by Wakefield and Norton in their translations of the New Testament. But it seems to involve serious difficulties, which are not satisfactorily explained by these eminent commentators. Our Saviour is referring to the time when he was to be personally withdrawn from the disciples, and another Helper (παράκλητος), the Holy Spirit, should, as it were, take his place. But why should he say that then they would *ask him no questions* ? Was it worth while to tell them that they would not do what from the nature of the case was impossible ? It is to be observed further that *me* is the emphatic word in the sentence, — emphatic

both by form (ἐμέ) and position. We have then the meaning, "In that day you will ask no questions of *me*," but — what is the antithesis? We are told that the meaning is, You will have *no need* to question me, because the Holy Spirit will enlighten you. But is not this putting violence on the simple ἐμέ οὐκ ἐρωήσετε οὐδέν? Further, though an antithesis is so strongly demanded by the emphatic ἐμέ, according to this explanation we have none expressed, and none which is plainly suggested by the immediate context.

If now, on the other hand, we take ἐρωήσετε in the sense of "to request," all is smooth and natural. The emphatic ἐμέ finds its immediate antithesis in τὸν πατέρα; and we have no sudden transition from the subject of putting questions to that of petitioning. We have similar examples of the interchange of ἐρωάω and αἰρέω in Acts iii. 2, 3, and I John v. 16; and it accords with the ordinary use of the words, ἐρωάω being elsewhere employed of the requests addressed by the disciples to Christ, αἰρέω of their petitions to God. Though after the departure of their Master from the earth the disciples would not address their petitions directly to him, as they had done when he was personally present with them, they would have all needed aid; whatever they should ask of the Father, he would give them in his name, that is on his account, or on account of their relation to him, they being as it were his representatives, carrying on his work upon the earth; comp. ch. xiv. 26, also Matt. xviii. 19, 20.

Though a majority of the best scholars adopt the other interpretation, it is too much to say, with Archbishop Trench, that "every one competent to judge is agreed" that the words must be so understood. Among the scholars who take ἐρωάω here in the sense of "to request," are Henry Stephens in his *Thesaurus* s. v. ἐρωάω, Grotius, Vossius (*Harm. Ev.* i. c. 18, § 18; *Opp.* vi. 151), Le Clerc (*Nouv. Test.*), Beausobre and Lenfant (*N. T.*), Schoettgen, Archbishop Newcome in his translation, Baumgarten-Crusius, Weizsäcker (*Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.*, 1857, ii. 183, note), and Weiss (*Der johan. Lehrbegriff*, Berl. 1862, p. 278), who in a pretty full discussion of the passage does not hesitate to call this an "evidente exegetische Resultat." Schleusner, in his *Lexicon*, though explaining the clause in question by "habebitis idoneam et perfectam scientiam," says, "Alii non minus commode reddunt, tum nihil amplius a me petetis. Confer sequentia," and Schirlitz (*Wörterb. zum N. T.*, 3^e Aufl., 1868) assigns to ἐρωάω here the meaning *bitten*, "to request." Bretschneider, Wahl, and Robinson do not notice the passage. Among our American commentators who have assigned this meaning to ἐρωάω here may be mentioned Barnes (though he thinks there may be a reference to both meanings of the

word), and Dr. Howard Crosby in his "Notes on the New Testament." According to Bloomfield (*Recensio Synoptica* in loc.), ἐπαράω is explained in this passage as meaning "to request" by Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodore of Heraclea, and Theophylact. This is, however, not quite correct. Chrysostom, Theophylact, and also Euthymius recognize *both* meanings of ἐπαράω in their notes on the verse, kindly allowing the reader his choice. The expression used by Nonnus in his Paraphrase may be regarded as ambiguous. There seems to be nothing bearing on the point in the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia (Migne's *Patrol. Græca*, Vol. LXVI.). Theodore of Heraclea is probably the author of some of the notes on the Gospel of John, of which fragments have been preserved in a Gothic translation published by Massmann under the title *Skeireins Aivaggeljons thairh Johannen*, München, 1834; but there appears to be among them no note on John xvi. 23, nor do I know on what the statement of Bloomfield respecting this writer can be founded.

Whatever view may be taken of the disputed passage, the interpretation just given has too much in its favor, and is supported by too many respectable scholars, to be dismissed at once with contempt.

It may be said, however, that the above explanation of ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐρωτήσετε οὐδέν is forbidden by the fact that the early Christians habitually addressed their prayers to Christ, as is shown by the use of the expression "to call upon the name of the Lord," Acts ix. 14, 21; xxii. 16; Rom. x. 12-14; 1 Cor. i. 2 (comp. Acts ii. 21; 2 Tim. ii. 22); and by the examples of Stephen (Acts vii. 59) and Paul (2 Cor. xii. 8). I admit that if the phrase οἱ ἐπικαλούμενοι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου as applied to the early Christians implies that their *petitions* were habitually addressed to Christ instead of to the Father in his name, this fact is an objection to the interpretation proposed. The question is one of no little interest; but to discuss it here would carry us much too far, and might lead into the thorny paths of dogmatic theology.

E. A.

2. — *National Debts*. By R. DUDLEY BAXTER, M. A. Partly read before the British Association at Liverpool, September, 1870. London. 1871. 8vo. pp. 139.

THAT the expenditures of the principal nations of Europe have, since the French Revolution, greatly exceeded their income, that the payment of the mere interest on the debts now accumulated absorbs a large fraction of the annual revenue, and that every war largely increases the total accumulation, are familiar facts. But the history of the suc-